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INTRODUCTION
In the prologue to From Labour Law to Social Competition Law?,1 Marc Rigaux prudently 
begins by pointing to the dangers of expressing oneself on the future of labour law, 
which is in seemingly perpetual crisis and flux. Happily, the contributors are not cowed 
by the challenge of gazing into the future, and what follows is a wide-ranging explora-
tion of a series of interrelated themes focusing on the legal, and extra-legal, processes 
and phenomena that shape the essential functions of labour law. The collection develops 
four themes, and aspects of each will be explored in this article. 
First, the collection considers the relationship between labour law, the labour market 
and social competition. Here, we will focus on the limits of labour law as a corrective 
mechanism to what the authors see as its clear existential threat: the liberalisation of 
markets at the European and global levels. Secondly, the contributions look at the tie 
between labour law and human dignity and the conceptual shift from viewing labour as 
a commodity to allowing the worker to obtain the status of citizen within the enterprise. 
The role of human rights in the development of labour law will be considered in rela-
tion to this theme. Thirdly, the relationship between labour law, market law and ‘(social) 
competition law’2 is examined; here, we will focus on issues concerned with the spread 
* Department of Law, Maynooth University, County Kildare, Ireland. Email: michael.b.doherty@nuim.ie.
1 Marc Rigaux, Jan Buelens and Amanda Latinne (eds), From Labour Law to Social Competition Law? 
(Intersentia, 2014).
2 Marc Rigaux, ‘Labour Law or Social Competition Law? The Right to Dignity of Working People Ques-
tioned (Once Again)’ in Rigaux et al, ibid, 1.
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of market (and contract) law and the dominant philosophy of entrepreneurial freedom. 
Finally, the collection considers the risk of a renewed contestation of the dignity of work-
ing people. In relation to this theme, we will reflect on the view that nation states have 
lost control over markets and that national systems of social adjustment now compete 
amongst themselves. 
TINKERING AROUND THE EDGES
Labour lawyers and labour relations practitioners (such as trade unionists and human 
resource management professionals) often feel quite protective of the ‘autonomous’ 
nature of labour law. Much regulation of the labour market is generated by the social 
partners, for example either through collective bargaining between unions and employ-
ers at national, sectoral or company level or, more remarkably, by dint of the privileged 
status accorded to the social partners and to social dialogue by EU law.3 Most EU 
Member States have established unique systems by which employment disputes are 
adjudicated upon in employment tribunals (rather than ‘regular courts’), which are fre-
quently staffed by employment relations professionals (rather than ‘regular judges’).4 
However, the contributions in this collection point over and over again to the dangers, 
indeed naïveté, of searching for labour law instruments only in labour law.5 The limited 
competence in the sphere of labour law afforded to the EU legislator in the Treaties (see 
Articles 151 and 153 TFEU) has not prevented decisions of the Court from radically 
impacting national labour law. Such interventions, however, have not been ‘full frontal’; 
rather, momentous decisions in the field have arisen from disputes in relation to com-
pany law,6 public procurement law,7 and the law on transfer of undertakings.8 
Moreover, in the context of measures taken to address the ongoing economic crisis in 
the EU, wide-ranging labour law instruments have been found in the Memorandums of 
Understanding agreed between the ‘Troika’ of the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the ‘programme 
3 Art 152 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) states: ‘The Union recognises and 
promotes the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the diversity of national systems. 
It shall facilitate dialogue between the social partners, respecting their autonomy.’ Arts 154 and 155 TFEU 
provide a procedure that combines the consultation of the social partners by the Commission with the 
option to leave social regulation to bipartite agreement between management and labour organised at 
European level: www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/europeanso-
cialdialogue.htm (all websites accessed 9 October 2014).
4 Susan Corby and Pete Burgess, Adjudicating Employment Rights: A Cross-National Approach (Palgrave, 
2014).
5 Jens Schubert, ‘Instruments of Labour Law’ in Rigaux, Buelens and Latinne (n 1) 21.
6 Most particularly, in relation to what Schubert (ibid, 24) refers to as the Court’s ‘generous’ interpretation of 
the freedom of establishment provisions in cases like Case C-208/00 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction 
Company Baumanagement GmbH [2002] ECR I-9919.
7 Case C-346/06 Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989.
8 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Ltd (judgment of 18 July 2013).
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469Back to the Future of EU Labour Law? 
countries’, which received ‘bail-out’ packages.9 Even for those countries not bound by 
such agreements, the putting in place of a strict economic governance package for Euro-
zone countries means that the Country-Specific Recommendations (CSRs), issued to 
Member States, have become ever more intrusive in the area of labour law, focusing 
increasingly on wage-setting mechanisms.10 Bekker and Klosse note that at least five 
coordination mechanisms now support CSRs, ranging from soft law policy coordina-
tion (the Euro Plus Pact and Europe 2020) to measures which combine soft law and hard 
law mechanisms (the Stability and Growth Pact and the Macro-Economic Imbalances 
Procedure).11 
Thus, defending or reinforcing labour rights will involve much more than simply 
reforming or reshaping labour laws (not that there is anything simple about that!) or 
reconfiguring judicial institutions;12 it will require a radical rethinking of social and eco-
nomic orthodoxy within the European Union. This conclusion chimes, in any case, with 
a number of contributions to the collection which take the view that labour law can only 
provide a marginal correction to the worst excesses of (labour) market liberalisation; it 
cannot, without more, modify the ‘bases and principles of the market’s existence and 
functioning’.13 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND LABOUR LAW
At several points in the collection, it is emphasised that labour is not a commodity. The 
primary function of labour law, therefore, is to guarantee and preserve the human dig-
nity of the worker. This role is fulfilled, albeit to varying degrees in different countries, 
by labour laws underpinning basic rights of citizenship within the enterprise, including, 
for example, the political right to elect representatives. Increasingly, though, the issue 
has arisen as to whether labour rights are, or should be conceived of as, fundamental 
human rights. 
To some extent, the invocation of human rights standards in the context of labour 
rights is born of desperation. As national labour law systems, and particularly national 
9 In the case of Greece and Ireland, for example, see Eftychia Achtsioglou and Michael Doherty, ‘There Must 
Be Some Way Out of Here … The Crisis, Labour Rights and Member States in the Eye of the Storm’ (2014) 
20 European Law Journal 219.
10 For 2014–15, see http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2014/overview_recommendations_2014_by_
member_state_en.pdf.
11 Sonja Bekker and Saskia Klosse, ‘EU Governance of Economic and Social Policies: Chances and Challenges 
for Social Europe’ [2013] European Journal of Social Law 103. CSRs were originally formulated in the con-
text of the (soft law) Open Method of Coordination (OMC). 
12 Schubert, for example, proposes setting up specific ‘labour law chambers’ at the Court of Justice ((n 5) 28). 
The idea has merit, but runs the risk of creating a ‘hierarchy’ of chambers at the Court (it would not be 
too difficult to imagine where labour law might place in such a pecking order) and considerable scope for 
procedural wrangling before a claim could be heard at all. 
13 See Rigaux (n 2) 3. 
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organised labour movements, struggle to regulate globalised (labour) markets, the 
attempts to lay claim to ‘fundamental rights’ status intensify. Jaspers and Roozendaal 
consider the extent to which conceptualising labour rights as fundamental social rights 
adds value, in terms of achieving adequate protection for workers compared to the pro-
tection provided by ‘traditional’ national or international labour laws.14 Drawing on 
the work of Mantouvalou, they outline three different approaches to examining labour 
rights as human rights.15 The positivistic approach sees a fundamental right as being 
recognised as such when it has been adopted in international treaties or other sources 
of international law. The instrumental approach looks at the consequences of using 
strategies, primarily litigation, which promote labour rights as human rights. The third 
approach is a normative one; the rights in question are seen to have a compelling moral 
weight and are universal and imperative (implying that such rights are not subordinate 
to other interests).
In terms of the positivistic view, there are long-standing declarations on the funda-
mental status of labour rights, from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and 
in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The EU, following the Treaty 
of Lisbon, is to accede to the ECHR, where recent jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights has been much more sympathetic to labour rights than that of the 
Luxembourg Court.16 The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon also, of course, gave 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights the same legal status as the Treaties. The Charter 
explicitly protects the rights of freedom of association (Article 12), the freedom to choose 
an occupation and the right to engage in work (Article 15) and, in Title IV (Solidarity), 
the rights to collective bargaining and action and the right to fair and just working con-
ditions. There has been an ongoing debate about the extent to which the Charter’s new 
status, following Lisbon, will impact on the Court’s jurisprudence, in particular in the 
area of labour rights.17 It is early days, but there is scant evidence to date that the Court 
will fundamentally rethink its approach; see the decisions in cases like Commission v 
Germany,18 Palhota19 and Alemo-Herron20 (notwithstanding some of the comments of 
the Advocates General in the cases).21 Indeed, the decision in Alemo-Herron forcefully 
reminds us that some fundamental economic rights, like the freedom to conduct a busi-
14 Teun Jaspers and Willemijn Roozendaal, ‘Fundamental Social Rights: An Added Value to the Protection of 
Workers’ in Rigaux et al (n 1) 107.
15 Virginia Mantouvalou, ‘Are Labour Rights Human Rights?’ (2012) 18 European Law Journal 151.
16 Keith Ewing and John Hendy, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 39 Industrial Law 
Journal 30. Although see Application No 4241/03 Trofimchuk v Ukraine (28 October 2010) and Application 
No 31045/10 RMT v UK (8 April 2014).
17 See eg Sybe de Vries, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic Freedoms According to the European 
Court of Justice’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 169.
18 Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR I-7091.
19 Case C-515/08 dos Santos Palhota and Others [2010] ECR I-9133.
20 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Ltd (judgment of 18 July 2013).
21 Phil Syrpis, ‘Reconciling Economic Freedoms and Social Rights: The Potential of Commission v Germany 
(Case C-271/08, Judgment of 15 July 2010)’ (2011) 40 Industrial Law Journal 222.
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471Back to the Future of EU Labour Law? 
ness in Article 16 of the Charter, also gained an ‘upgrade’ post-Lisbon. Following the 
decisions in the ‘Laval Quartet’, the European Trade Union Congress (ETUC) has pushed 
hard, albeit to date without success, for a ‘Social Progress Protocol’, which includes a dec-
laration (in Article 3) that ‘nothing in the Treaties, and in particular neither economic 
freedoms nor competition rules, shall have priority over fundamental social rights’. 
However, it seems that the instrumental appeal to fundamental rights as a defence to 
attacks on labour standards has failed spectacularly in recent years. This is most evident 
in relation to responses to the crisis. Particularly, but not exclusively, in the ‘programme 
countries’, the requirements of the Troika have meant that international law obligations 
have been ignored and national constitutional principles set aside.22 The ease with which 
‘fundamental’ rights have been dispensed, in order to implement austerity policies, has 
been instructive. 
Nonetheless, Jaspers and Roozendaal, whilst concluding that fundamental social 
rights add value, at best, in a very modest way to worker protection in the EU, note that 
‘their moral weight should not be underestimated’.23 This is undoubtedly true, but we 
cannot leave matters there. The idea of fundamental human rights protection is often 
discussed at too abstract a level, or in merely symbolic terms. More worryingly, it can 
become the focus of popular cynicism and discontent; witness recent debates in the 
United Kingdom in relation to the application of the Human Rights Acts 1998.24 Labour 
law and policy could (should) be a means of concretising human rights; ‘labour law has 
the potential to bring human rights (declared in a very abstract and general manner and 
acknowledged by constitutions and many international treaties) into people’s everyday 
lives’.25 Achieving this would make it much more difficult for such rights to be set aside, 
in the manner described above, whenever it is deemed that they cannot be afforded. 
It is here that those seeking to reinforce and defend labour standards—notably, but 
by no means exclusively, trade union movements—have failed. Labour rights in general, 
and collective labour rights in particular, simply do not register (certainly in the ‘Anglo’ 
world) as ‘fundamental’. They are not seen as ‘universal and imperative, with a special 
moral weight that normally overrides other considerations’,26 and, as such, this weakens 
their instrumental value. However, even if one does not wish to invoke fundamental 
22 In terms of ILO obligations, see eg Case 2820 in the 365th Report of the Committee on Freedom of Asso-
ciation (November 2012), 784-2003, www.ilo.org/gb/GBSessions/GB316/ins/WCMS_193260/lang--en/
index.htm. The European Committee for Social Rights (ECSR), the main supervisory body for the Council 
of Europe’s Social Charter, in its Conclusions for 2013, found 180 cases of violations of the Charter con-
cerning health, social security and social protection. Programme countries Greece and Romania received 
a particularly high number of negative conclusions; see www.coe.int/T/DGHL/Monitoring/SocialCharter/
NewsCOEPortal/Conclusions2013Publication_en.asp. 
23 Jaspers and Roozendaal (n 14) 122.
24 See www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/what-are-human-rights/human-rights-act/human-
rights-act-myths.
25 Barbara Kresal, ‘Mutating or Dissolving Labour Law?’ in Rigaux et al (n 1) 141, 151.
26 Hugh Collins, ‘Theories of Rights as Justifications for Labour Law’ in Guy Davidov and Brian Langille 
(eds), The Idea of Labour Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 137.
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rights arguments, the ‘public relations’ battle must be fought and fought harder. A good 
crisis should never be wasted; the value of labour standards, and how these should be 
promoted and defended, should be at the centre of debates about the future of the EU 
project and of the type of social and economic model desired by European workers and 
citizens. In this, the ETUC’s push for a Social Progress Protocol could be an extremely 
useful rallying point. 
COMPETING VISIONS
A core theme running through the collection is that (EU) market law has intruded into all 
areas of socio-economic regulation, with market liberalisation and the associated focus 
on freedom of contract and individual autonomy posing an existential threat to labour 
law. Däubler specifically addresses how social values and competition co-exist.27 Here,28 
he draws striking parallels between contemporary ‘neo-liberal’ attacks on labour law in 
the EU and the famous Lochner29 decision of the US Supreme Court in 1905, which 
declared a law limiting the hours bakers could work to be an ‘unreasonable, unnecessary 
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to enter into a contract related 
to his business’. 
Däubler is concerned with the growing importance of the principle of competition, 
in law but also in other social processes. Achtsioglou and Doherty have similarly argued 
that ‘competition’ has been rendered a general norm in EU policymaking, by which ‘any 
regulatory policy choice is assessed in terms of its ability to favour this specific model of 
market governance’.30 The shift from the decision in Albany,31 where the Court refused 
to apply competition law rules to collective agreements aimed at improving working 
conditions, to the approach taken in Viking32 and Laval33 has been well documented.34 
The freedom of movement provisions in the treaties, which originally focused on the 
prohibition of discrimination, have been developed by the Court, over time, to amount 
to entrepreneurial freedoms, restrictions on which must be justified. In Alemo-Herron, 
the Court found, in the context of a transfer of undertaking, that to enforce ‘dynamic 
clauses’—by virtue of which the transferee could be bound not only by collective agree-
ments in force at the time of the transfer at issue but also agreements subsequent to that 
27 Wolfgang Däubler, ‘Labour Law and Competition’ in Rigaux et al (n 1) 57.
28 Ibid, 63.
29 Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905).
30 Achtsioglou and Doherty (n 9) 233.
31 Case C-67/96 Albany International v Stichting Bedriffspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751.
32 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line [2007] 
ECR I-10779.
33 Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767.
34 In this collection, see Giovanni Orlandini and Filip Dorssemont, ‘Market Rules and the Right to Strike: A 
Different Approach’, 67.
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473Back to the Future of EU Labour Law? 
transfer—would mean that the transferee’s ‘contractual freedom is seriously reduced to 
the point that such a limitation is liable to adversely affect the very essence of its freedom 
to conduct a business’;35 as noted above, a freedom protected by Article 16 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights. 
Däubler sees the current crisis as an opportunity to mount a counter-attack, a time 
to develop new forms of social solidarity and to revitalise collective bargaining: ‘The 
neo-liberal idea has suffered a big defeat. This fact should be mentioned more and more 
and it should be treated as self-evident by the public opinion.’36 It is submitted, however, 
that this is another ‘public relations’ battle that is being lost. Far from an intensified 
European debate on the appropriate responses to the crisis and future directions, we have 
seen fragmentation and a retreat to insularity, characterised by national navel-gazing 
(witness all the policy statements, conferences and symposia that ‘compare’ whether 
Greece or Ireland or Romania or Germany or Denmark have fared better or worse) and 
wide-scale abandonment of social dialogue. Policy responses have been driven by inter-
governmentalism; we have seen, for example, no fundamental attempts to reform EU 
social legislation and no intervention from the Court of Justice on the impact of the 
economic measures demanded by the Troika (unlike the clear interventions from the 
ILO and the Council of Europe). Instead, in the Eurozone, where currency devaluation 
is not an option, we see the ‘burden of adjustment’ falling on national labour law systems 
(with the aim always to reduce their ‘distorting effects’), which now increasingly compete 
with one another. 
SOCIAL COMPETITION AND DIGNITy AT WORK
Supiot has commented that even ‘national legislative models are today treated as so 
many products in competition with each other in the world market of norms’.37 Finan-
cial soundness ratings, attributed to states by private corporations, determine their value 
on financial markets. A country’s score on the ‘Doing Business’ index of the World Bank, 
or the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index of the IMF, is worse if its labour 
law system guarantees more rights or greater protections to workers.38 As noted above, 
although the Union legislator has limited competence in the sphere of labour law, deci-
sions of the Court of Justice have radically impacted upon national labour law systems. 
In circumstances where it seems nation states are more and more struggling to regu-
late global markets, how can labour standards be secured? Throughout the collection, 
contributors return again and again to the idea of the nexus between decent work and 
human dignity. As Reyniers argues:
35 Case C-426/11 Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Ltd (judgment of 18 July 2013), para 35.
36 Wolfgang Däubler, ‘Labour Law and Competition’ in Rigaux et al (n 1) 66.
37 Alain Supiot, ‘Law and Labour: A World Market of Norms?’ (2006) 39 New Left Review 109, 112.
38 Kresal (n 25) 152. 
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The fact that work/labour is considered as a means to achieve human dignity does not only 
follow from the economic meaning of work/labour (i.e. a means to support oneself). Indeed, 
work is also the fundamental activity that allows people to develop themselves personally and 
socially. In a way, people take their identity from their work, which also gives meaning to life.39 
Echoing the point made above about concretising fundamental human rights, the idea 
of decent work as central to human dignity is one that those concerned with defending 
labour standards need to strongly reassert. As with the ETUC’s Social Progress Clause, 
the ILO has already provided a platform from which to begin: the Declaration on Social 
Justice for a Fair Globalization, which formalises the Decent Work Agenda.40 However, 
this must be made meaningful to everyday working life. As such, debates around access 
to labour rights (procedurally, in terms of dispute resolution systems, but also in terms 
of extending the coverage of labour law beyond ‘employees’), around living (not mini-
mum) wages and around industrial democracy and social dialogue must be brought 
centre stage at EU level. An appeal to political self-interest might be made here. Monti 
has noted that the Court of Justice jurisprudence on collectively bargained standards ‘has 
the potential to alienate from the Single Market and the EU a segment of public opin-
ion, workers’ movements and trade unions, which has been over time a key supporter 
of economic integration’.41 It is submitted that it is not simply workers’ movements that 
are disconcerted by a potential ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of working terms and con-
ditions, and social protection, but that the current economic climate has engendered 
a much more widespread public suspicion of greater integration measures at EU level 
(witness the 2014 European Parliament elections). Ongoing failure to protect the labour 
standards of ordinary workers is unlikely to contribute to social cohesion and popular 
support for national or international governing institutions in an era of crisis.42
CONCLUSION
From Labour Law to Social Competition Law? illustrates the central, yet complex, role that 
labour law plays in contemporary social and economic life and makes the compelling 
39 Kelly Reyniers, ‘Human Dignity and Decent Work as Ultimate Objectives of Labour Law’ in Rigaux et al 
(n 1) 165 (emphasis in the original). It is interesting to note, when discussing the role of labour law, the 
debate in social theory about the role of work in contemporary life. Whilst some have argued that work 
is no longer central as a source of personal identity (eg Ulrich Beck, The Brave New World of Work (Polity, 
2000)), others have asserted the centrality of work in fulfilling vital personal and social needs (eg Michael 
Doherty, ‘When the Working Day is Through: The End of Work as Identity?’ (2009) 23 Work, Employment 
and Society 84). 
40 www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang--de/index.htm. 
41 Mario Monti, ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market—At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’, 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/strategy/docs/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf, 68.
42 Michael Doherty, ‘Battered and Fried? Regulation of Working Conditions and Wage-Setting after the John 
Grace Decision’ (2012) 35 Dublin University Law Journal 97. 
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case that a reformulation, to better reconcile social rights and economic freedoms, is 
urgently required. However, it makes clear, too, that any field of law can only be analysed 
by reference to underlying social reality. Consequently, ‘in view of the omnipresence of 
liberal economic worldviews’, any reformulation will demand the emergence and mobi-
lisation of an ‘effective social countervailing power’.43 Back to the future indeed. 
43 Amanda Latinne, ‘Labour Law or Social Competition Law: Some Concluding Critical Remarks’, 175, 186; 
René de Quenaudon, ‘Droit du travail ou droit de la concurrence sociale’, p 15.
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